DiXi Group Winter Outlooks: Domestic Gas Supply Sufficient, but Electricity Shortages of up to 5 GW Possible

On November 19, the third online Energy Security Talks event took place, where the DiXi Group analytical center presented Winter Outlooks: Assessment of the State of Ukraine’s Gas and Electricity Infrastructure, Risks, and Scenarios for the 2024/2025 Autumn-Winter Season. The analytical documents were prepared using data from open sources.

In her opening remarks, the President of DiXi Group, Olena Pavlenko, noted that Ukraine is entering its third winter of full-scale war, which is likely to be the toughest yet.

“Already, we are seeing power outages in some regions due to the restoration of the energy system following the attacks on November 17. The scenario of regular outages is becoming increasingly realistic. Many are asking critical questions: How severe is the situation? Are there sufficient reserves? Can gas generation be a solution? And is the claim of 20-hour daily blackouts true? These are valid questions, but the answers must be based on clear facts and data.

That’s why the DiXi Group team prepares regular analytical reviews describing the current state of the energy sector, enabling forecasts based on verified facts and figures. This helps people prepare for winter and counters Russian manipulation and disinformation,” said Olena Pavlenko.

She emphasized that hosting Energy Security Talks regularly provides an opportunity to discuss key energy security challenges, gather expert opinions, and develop solutions to help Ukraine manage winter risks effectively.

Winter Outlooks: ELECTRICITY

In the section on electricity, General Manager for Security and Resilience at DiXi Group, Olena Lapenko, outlined Ukraine’s readiness for winter challenges. Losses in thermal generation reached nearly 90%, but extensive repair campaigns during the summer and fall managed to restore up to 3 GW of capacity, according to the Ministry of Energy. An additional 1 GW is expected to come online through distributed generation projects.

She highlighted key threats to the resilience of the energy system this winter:

• Intensive Russian attacks on energy infrastructure
• Volatile weather conditions
• Hydropower shortages
• A seasonal drop in renewable energy generation by 40–70%
• High winter demand, which may reach 19 GW

“Despite ongoing restoration efforts, the November 17 attack on the energy system severely impacted thermal and hydropower generation, as well as Ukrenergo facilities, significantly reducing available capacity. Additionally, renewable generation decreases in winter, and hydropower critically depends on water resources, which are scarce this year due to a dry summer and fall. Even after partial restoration, the situation will remain challenging due to high winter demand,” Lapenko explained.

Regarding the state of the power grid, the most critical conditions persist in frontline regions. Donetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia regions suffered the most from the latest strikes by the aggressor. Odesa also faces difficulties, with high-voltage network equipment disabled.

Despite martial law, Ukraine’s electricity market continues to operate, which is a significant achievement. However, price caps may hinder the ability to attract maximum import volumes, which will be crucial during a harsh winter. While new indicative prices reflect the real supply-demand balance in the energy system, they remain distorted by the difficult financial state of market participants.

Following Russia’s summer attacks, market shortages during peak consumption hours became apparent. A similar situation is now unfolding ahead of winter after further strikes on thermal and hydropower generation. This could lead to electricity deficits not only during peak hours but also at other times.

If neighboring markets face shortages as well, importing the necessary volumes will become problematic. For this reason, DiXi Group experts have developed several scenarios and electricity balance projections, accounting for various temperature regimes and Russian attacks.

Base Scenario Shows Cautious Optimism

The base scenario predicts no new attacks on the energy system and a moderate temperature regime. In this case, a deficit of up to 2 GW is expected due to seasonal demand growth. Limited commercial imports, caused by high demand in European countries, may pose an additional challenge. To balance the energy system, hourly blackout schedules and consumption reduction measures may be necessary.

“If thermal generation or hydropower plants can be restored, they could provide additional capacity, minimizing the deficit. In this optimistic scenario, power outages would occur only during evening hours and last for 3–4 hours at most during peak demand,” added Olena Lapenko.

The cold weather scenario assumes no new energy system attacks but an increase in average daily temperatures above normal levels. This could raise electricity consumption and create a deficit of up to 3.4 GW, or up to 5 GW in the absence of imports or unstable operation of restored generation. The International Energy Agency forecasts peak consumption at 18.5 GW. In this case, strict load-limitation schedules and rolling blackouts would be required.

The worst-case scenario under moderate weather conditions involves new attacks on thermal power plants and other generation facilities. While the deficit would not be as severe as during previous extreme frosts, risks to the energy system’s stability would be higher than in the other scenarios. Emergency blackout schedules would be necessary to prevent grid overload.

“In most scenarios, during periods of minimal load (at night or on sunny days), we expect no deficit, provided imports are available. However, if severe frosts occur (-10 to -15°C), even minimal load periods could see deficits. These could be covered by emergency aid or managed through blackout schedules extending beyond evening hours,” said the expert.

Commenting on the study, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Energy, Mykola Kolisnyk, emphasized the relevance of the analysis given the lack of open data. However, he noted that it omits key factors such as imports, commercial usage, emergency assistance, and energy transfer between zones, which are critical for a complete picture.

“Energy transfer between balancing zones remains a key issue. For example, the consumption and production structures in the Western United Energy System differ significantly from those in the Northern and Eastern zones due to objective factors and cross-border transmission availability. This is a determining factor in system stability and a primary target for enemy attacks. Properly calculating the balance of available capacity and consumption while ensuring inter-zonal transfers is essential. Due to the enemy’s activity, information about the energy system must remain classified to protect its stability,” Kolisnyk noted.

He also stressed that the scenario of 20-hour outages is unlikely.

“Even in critical situations, such as in the Odesa region, power supply is managed through schedules encompassing multiple shifts. Decentralized supply schemes in major cities ensure that critical infrastructure, like boilers, pumps, and water utilities, can operate during crises. Moreover, critical facilities are equipped with backup power sources, enabling them to function even under worst-case scenarios. These ‘energy islands’ help meet vital needs despite ongoing risks,” he added.

Winter Outlooks Gas   

Presenting the Winter Outlook: Gas, Olena Lapenko highlighted a more optimistic forecast for the gas system. However, as with electricity, outcomes depend on temperature and the intensity of Russian attacks.

The primary tasks are maintaining high production rates and effectively balancing gas imports. Despite challenges, Ukraine has stored 12.3 billion cubic meters of gas (as of October) and ensured stable production.

• The base scenario anticipates 6.5–7 billion cubic meters of gas remaining in storage after the heating season.
• Other scenarios include increased consumption due to low temperatures (+5–6%) and reduced production due to damaged facilities or private sector declines. In both cases, risks can be mitigated by increasing imports and boosting state production.

The industrial sector’s growing demand is driving a shift in gas consumption trends. “Businesses are increasingly concerned about their energy independence, installing gas generators. An additional gigawatt of gas-fired generation will influence consumption, with this trend becoming more evident in six months or so,” Lapenko noted.

Summarizing the discussions, DiXi Group President Olena Pavlenko emphasized the need for readiness for various scenarios, proactive recommendations, and ongoing modernization efforts.

“The energy situation has worsened following recent attacks, and Russia will likely continue its strikes. However, the government and energy companies are showing resilience in maintaining generation and supply. While apocalyptic scenarios are unlikely, prolonged outages are possible, depending on weather conditions, damage severity, and recovery speed,” she concluded.

Event was organized by DiXi Group as part of the “Improving Tomorrow’s Energy Security” project with support from the International Renaissance Foundation.