Electricity outages lasted almost 2 thousand hours in 2024
According to generalized data published on the Energy Map portal, household electricity outages* lasted 1,951 hours in 2024.
* Only scheduled stabilization outages for households introduced in all or the vast majority of Ukrainian regions (over 50%) were taken into account. Hourly outage schedules (HOS) in place in one or more regions were not included in the calculations.
The application of outage schedules was preceded by three waves of massive attacks that began on March 22. The attacks resulted in a power shortage in the energy system. To compensate for it, Ukrenergo ensured electricity imports and emergency support from the EU, and from April 18, it applied load shedding for industry and business.
Amid the damage to power facilities caused by the following two attacks and worsening weather conditions, the transmission system operator started applying hourly electricity outage schedules for households on May 16.
In June, Russia carried out three more waves of massive attacks, which, combined with rising temperatures and scheduled maintenance of certain power units, led to increased load shedding. Only 2 days of the month, the electricity was not cut off for households, while the remaining 28 days were subject to outages, which accounted for 66% of the month’s hours.
July was the month with the longest duration of outages for the year—582 hours, or 78% of the month’s hours. At the same time, outages were in effect twenty-four hours a day during 18 days of July. It is noteworthy that June and July also featured the highest electricity imports to the IPS of Ukraine, which, however, did not fully compensate for the deficit in the power system.
After Russia’s 9th massive attack on August 26, round-the-clock electricity outages lasted 11 consecutive days, from August 27 to September 6.
The power supply to households was not curtailed in October and the first half of November. However, following the 10th and 11th Russian massive strikes on November 17 and 28, the load shedding resumed.
The 12th and 13th massive attacks took place on December 13 and 25, leading to the return of the electricity outages, which remained in effect until almost the end of 2024. In December, power outages lasted 36% of the month.
In total, limitations on household electricity consumption were applied for 1,951 hours throughout Ukraine or in the vast majority of its regions. This is over 22% of the hours of the year.
Starting in June 2024, consumers in each region not included in the list of critical infrastructure facilities and electricity-importing enterprises were divided into six groups (queues). A queue is a group of customers with a certain level of electricity consumption. Starting in December, each queue was further divided into two sub-queues.
The maximum number of queues simultaneously subject to outages was four, with three queues being limited most often. On average, two queues experienced outages concurrently from June onward.
For comparison, in 2022, electricity outages began in the second half of October and lasted until mid-February 2023, for about four months. At the same time, the outages were mostly round-the-clock, while the number of queues was determined by the distribution system operators (oblenergos).
2024 was one of the most challenging years for Ukraine’s power system due to massive attacks that caused electricity shortages and required long-term load sheddings for households, businesses, and industries. The electricity outages became an essential indicator of the power system’s vulnerability and emphasized the critical need for its restoration, transformation towards the development of decentralized generation, and improving protection from further potential attacks.
The preparation of this material was made possible thanks to the support of the American people, provided through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) within the framework of the project “Energy Sector Transparency”, implemented by the DiXi Group NGO. The information presented in this material is the sole responsibility of the DiXi Group NGO and under no circumstances can be considered as reflecting the position of USAID or the US Government.
