The State Ownership Policy (hereinafter – Policy), adopted on November 29, 2024, is a key document guiding corporate governance reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The Policy adoption was one of the government commitments under the Ukraine Plan and the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility program. While listing data to be published by SOEs (paragraph 153), the document also provides that, during martial law, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU) may, in the interests of national security and defense, allow certain SOEs (particularly critical infrastructure operators, defense industry entities) to withhold specific information from disclosure (paragraph 159).
On October 10, 2025, the CMU amended the Procedure for disclosure of information by SOEs (hereinafter – Procedure). The amendments apply during martial law and also concern a limited group of SOEs that operate critical infrastructure or belong to the defense industry sector. The relevant enterprises and the managing authorities were entitled to submit proposals regarding the list of information and documents covered by the Procedure that may be withheld from publication during martial law.
Neither of the aforementioned regulations requires SOEs, managing authorities, or the CMU to substantiate their proposals and/or decisions to close the information, which created favorable preconditions for a discretionary decline in transparency.
Consequently, and based on these regulations, in December 2025, Ukrainian gas and electricity TSOs (Ukrenergo and Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine) were already exempted from the obligation to publish certain information on their activities. Namely, CMU orders No.1495-r and No.1498-r state that during martial law, these companies do not publish:
Also, the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture submitted draft acts proposing:
- NNEGC Energoatom JSC and Ukrhydroenergo PrJSC to be exempted from disclosing the entire scope of information covered by the Procedure (which includes 29 information items – from financial statements to the decisions of companies’ supervisory boards);
- Naftogaz of Ukraine NJSC to be granted partial exemptions for specific categories of information (5 information items).
For Energoatom and Ukrhydroenergo, the justifications are largely generic, based on the companies’ formal status as critical infrastructure operators and on the ongoing security threats. The explanatory notes do not provide a differentiated assessment of specific data categories or demonstrate how disclosure of information on corporate governance, finance, or management would create proportionate risks to national security.
Thus, the proposed approach would allow broad non-disclosure of information without sufficient justification. While references to national security concerns and attacks on energy infrastructure are made, they remain broad and abstract, not linked to the disclosure of specific information pieces. Such generalization risks undermining the transparency and accountability of strategically important SOEs.
In contrast, Naftogaz requested targeted exemptions limited to specific categories, such as:
However, even these specific requests rely primarily on general security considerations, without demonstrating why existing legal transparency requirements and public interest considerations should be overridden. Several proposed restrictions concern core elements of corporate governance transparency, which are central to anti-corruption safeguards and compliance with good governance standards.
Potential consequences
Such an approach to determining sensitive information raises serious concerns, as it effectively gives relevant SOEs the right to arbitrarily limit access to basic information on their functioning without a rationale behind it. The proposed non-disclosure would cover not only operational or security-sensitive data, but also information related to corporate governance, financial reporting, decision-making by supervisory boards, and other elements that are central to public accountability and anti-corruption safeguards. If implemented, such an approach poses a number of risks.
The first one is legal, as such a broad restriction contradicts the applicable Ukrainian legislation, which explicitly mandates the disclosure of specific categories of information, even under wartime conditions. For example, the Law of Ukraine ‘On access to public information’ stipulates that information on remuneration of SOEs management cannot be classified (Article 6(7)). The obligatory publication of annual financial statements by SOEs is provided by the Law of Ukraine ‘On the management of state-owned property’ (Article 9-6(3)). Given that respective disclosure obligations are enshrined in laws, the limitation of access to such information based on the CMU acts (resolutions/orders) will contradict the hierarchy of legal acts stipulated in the Constitution and thus can be challenged in court.
Another risk is that such a broad scope of restrictions creates a favorable environment for corruption. Deprived of basic information on the functioning and corporate governance of key SOEs in the energy sector, civil society becomes much weaker in its role as a watchdog capable of identifying potential abuses and misadministrations.
Regarding the reputational risk, following the major corruption scandal in the energy sector related to the ‘Midas’ case investigation by NABU and SAPO, the Government of Ukraine has clearly identified the ‘reboot’ of corporate governance in key energy SOEs as its main priority in the coming months. This is evidenced by the respective Action Plan adopted in response to the scandal. However, trust in these efforts may be significantly undermined in the eyes of the wider public and international partners if ministries simultaneously propose to limit access to information on the respective companies and their decision-making processes. Such limitations could negatively affect the ‘reboot’ itself, as appointing new SOEs’ management is not sufficient per se – effective accountability is equally essential, and proposed restrictions on data disclosure would make this considerably more difficult.
Recommendations
- amend both the Procedure and the Policy to ensure full reasoning is provided for any information closures;
- respect previously disclosed information;
- ensure compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements set by law;
- apply the legally defined ‘three-part test’ to all other categories of information;
- apply the principle that restrictions apply to specific information, not to documents.