“Science beyond politics” – is this a real paradigm or a utopia invented by the scientific community? Such a question could have remained purely theoretical for a long time. However, Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, strikes on civilian infrastructure, and other massive war crimes have placed it in direct ethical confrontation with reality.

Science thrives only in an environment of complete freedom, openness, and knowledge exchange. Therefore, the area of sanctions and restrictions maintains a high “tolerance” and makes certain exceptions for organizations and members of this community. Yet science is also an environment built and sustained by trust. Maintaining cooperation with an aggressor state undermines these fundamental values.

It is in this context that we examine three cases – INIR, ITER, and CERN – representing three fundamentally different platforms for international scientific and technical cooperation in nuclear energy, where Russia’s participation generates systemic risks.

The Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) is vulnerable to conflicts of interest, particularly with the involvement of Russian representatives, which calls into question its independence and impartiality. The INIR missions recommendations involving Russian representatives often correlate with subsequent selection of Russian technologies and contracts with Rosatom. Consequently, cooperation decisions are frequently made under the influence not only of financial incentives and political promises but also of such “expertise,” without proper analysis of alternatives.

The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, as a global scientific and technical platform with complex institutional architecture, grants Russia access to privileges and immunities. Their unscrupulous use opens pathways for sanctions circumvention and calls into question the compatibility of such participation with ethical principles. Technologies obtained through the project may be used for military purposes, contradicting the principles of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), as a symbol of open academic cooperation, demonstrates a moral-ethical choice: after 2022, its decision to suspend cooperation with Russia became a precedent for responsible action. Nevertheless, the continued participation in CERN projects of individual scientists affiliated with the allegedly “international” Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) creates additional security and reputational risks due to the JINR links to Russia’s military industry.

Of particular note is the fact that virtually all scientific and technical activities of the Russian Federation in nuclear energy are implemented through the state corporation Rosatom, which simultaneously serves as an integral part of the Russian military machine and a tool for advancing the Kremlin’s geopolitical interests.

Russia’s participation in international R&D projects is used not only for scientific development but also as a tool for geopolitical influence, access to critical technologies, and sanctions evasion. These practices must be stopped.

Recommended Actions

General:

  • Strengthen sanctions pressure on Rosatom by restricting its access to international financial markets and projects, including research and development;
  • Establish clear ethical criteria for participation in international scientific projects, taking into account the actions of the participating state or organization in the areas of human rights, international security, and integrity;
  • Institutionalize the role of ethics committees in multilateral projects to analyze the consequences of research cooperation, including risks of technologies militarization;
  • Create a mechanism for institutional replacement of Russia as a counterparty in contracts and project components, leveraging inter alia Ukrainian competencies;
  • Provide broad support for Ukrainian scientists and institutions within open research projects, strengthening their integration into international initiatives.

Within INIR:

  • Ensure transparency in the INIR missions’ composition and publish expert affiliations;
  • Initiate restrictions on or complete exclusion of Russian experts from INIR missions to prevent conflicts of interest;
  • Include clear provisions in cooperation contracts with the IAEA or countries hosting INIR missions for the removal of experts with conflicts of interest;
  • Engage a broader range of stakeholders in developing INIR recommendations, and cooperate primarily with the IAEA member states that maintain high nuclear safety standards;
  • Increase diplomatic pressure on the IAEA by Ukraine’s partners, demanding a review of practices for involving Russian specialists in the INIR missions and other programs.

Within ITER:

  • Initiate intergovernmental discussions on restricting Russia’s participation in the project, including raising the issue of the incompatibility of Russia’s actions with ITER’s ethical principles;
  • Strengthen oversight of compliance with the privileges and immunities regime – particularly through audits of supplies involving sanctioned organizations.

Within CERN:

  • Initiate complete suspension of cooperation with Russia and related organizations, including scientists affiliated with the JINR;
  • Support the replacement of Russian research groups with partners from countries that comply with international law.

This material was prepared by DIXI GROUP NGO with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation within the framework of the project “Strengthening Ukraine’s Resilience in Energy.” The material reflects the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the position of the International Renaissance Foundation.